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THE TOBACCO DIARIES: LESSONS LEARNED AND 
APPLIED TO REGULATION OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS 
JOANNA K. SAX∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Little is known about adverse reactions to dietary supplements 
because these events are underreported.1  The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration’s (“FDA”) ability to regulate dietary supplements has a 
long and complicated history, and the battle over regulation contin-
ues.2  On a simple level, the debate over regulation of dietary supple-
ments boils down to the FDA’s charge to protect the public from 
harmful drugs and devices3 versus manufacturers’ desire not to be 
regulated and individuals’ autonomy to make decisions about what 
supplements to take.  The arguments surrounding this debate are 
reminiscent of the debates surrounding the regulation of tobacco.  
The tobacco companies fought hard to keep the FDA out of regulat-
ing cigarettes; some members of the public argued that they should 
be allowed to take personal responsibility over the choice to use to-
bacco; and the FDA fought to bring tobacco within its regulatory au-
thority. 
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 1.  See Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids 
Adulterated Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg. 6788, 6817 (Feb. 
11, 2004) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 119) (“There is little doubt that dietary supplement 
adverse events are underreported . . . .  There is no requirement that manufacturers of 
dietary supplements report such events to FDA.  Moreover, the usual reporters of [adverse 
events], physicians, are often unaware of the events themselves or the person’s history of 
dietary supplement use.”). 
 2.  For a brief history of the FDA’s attempts to regulate dietary supplements, see Mark 
A. Kassel, From a History of Near Misses: The Future of Dietary Supplement Regulation, 49 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 237, 249–60 (1994). 
 3.  At present, dietary supplements are regulated as food, not drugs.  See Dietary Sup-
plement Health and Education Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2006) (“[A] dietary supplement 
shall be deemed to be a food within the meaning of this chapter.”).   
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Although this Article is not about tobacco, an examination of the 
history of the tobacco industry’s efforts to evade regulation is instruc-
tive.4  Tobacco, like many of the ingredients in dietary supplements, is 
natural.  It is clear, however, that cigarettes, which contain tobacco, 
are harmful.  This is also true of some dietary supplements.  For ex-
ample, some natural products, such as St. John’s wort, can be harm-
ful.5  Some additives to dietary supplements, such as ephedra or dime-
thylamylamine, can be harmful even though other ingredients in a 
product may be benign.6  The dietary supplement industry has many 
similarities to the tobacco industry—both utilize natural products, do 
not want to be heavily regulated, and have ingredients that are harm-
ful or lethal.  For these reasons, the history of the tobacco industry’s 
efforts to avoid regulation is instructive in determining what role the 
FDA should play in the regulation of the dietary supplement industry. 
This Article examines the future role of the FDA in the regula-
tion of the dietary supplement industry.7  “A dietary supplement is a 
product taken by mouth that is intended to supplement the diet and 
that contains one or more ‘dietary ingredients.’”8  Many consumers 
                                                        
 4.  See infra Part II. 
 5.  See Marcus Mannel, Drug Interactions with St John’s Wort: Mechanisms and Clinical Im-
plications, 27 DRUG SAFETY 774, 788 (2004) (“Although evidence is rather weak, the risk of 
developing serotonin syndrome and other central adverse reactions cannot be ruled out.  
Therefore, combinations of St John’s wort with psychotropic medications, in particular 
with serotonergic drugs (for example, SSRIs, tricyclic antidepressants, venlafaxine, trypto-
phan, tramadol, buspirone) and other antidepressants, should be used cautiously.”); see, 
e.g., Risk of Drug Interactions with St. John’s Wart and Indinavir and Other Drugs, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsand
Providers/ 
DrugSafetyInformationforHeathcareProfession-
als/PublicHealthAdvisories/ucm052238.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 6.  See FDA News Release P04-17, FDA Issues Regulation Prohibiting Sale of Dietary Sup-
plements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids and Reiterates Its Advice That Consumers Stop Using 
These Products (Feb. 6, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ 
PressAnnouncements/2004/ucm108242.htm (“[Ephedra] raises blood pressure and oth-
erwise stresses the circulatory system.  These effects are linked to significant adverse health 
outcomes, including heart attack and stroke.”); Natasha Singer & Peter Lattman, A 
Workout Booster, and a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/business/death-after-use-of-jack3d-shows-gap-in-
regulation.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“In the medical literature, [dimethylamylamine] 
has often been described as a synthetic stimulant similar to amphetamines that can con-
strict blood vessels, raise blood pressure and heart rate, potentially increasing the risk of 
heart attacks and strokes.”). 
 7.  See infra Part III. 
 8.  What Is the Difference Between a Dietary Supplement and a Conventional Food?, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
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are not aware that dietary supplements are not regulated in the same 
manner as over-the-counter (“OTC”) drugs.9  This misunderstanding 
is compounded by the fact that dietary supplements are often sold in 
the same store aisles as OTC drugs.10 
Recent accounts report the harmful, even lethal, effects of ingest-
ing certain dietary supplements.  For example, multiple deaths have 
been linked to ingestion of a product called Jack3d, which contains 
dimethylamylamine and is marketed as a workout booster.11  The 
medical literature describes dimethylamylamine as a “synthetic stimu-
lant similar to amphetamines.”12  After two soldiers who had used 
Jack3d died, the Department of Defense banned the product from be-
ing sold on military bases.13  Nevertheless, the product has not been 
removed from the shelves of General Nutrition Centers and other 
venues that sell dietary supplements.14  As one newspaper article sug-
gests, the soldiers’ deaths exemplify the shortcomings in the regula-
tion of dietary supplements.15  Following the deaths, the FDA issued 
warning letters.16  Without definitive proof, the FDA’s ability to ban 
the product is limited.17 
Critics of the FDA’s response to reports of adverse consequences 
of ingestion of Jack3d may not fully understand the limitations of the 
FDA’s authority under the Dietary Supplement Health and Education 
Act of 1994 (“DSHEA”).18  Described in more detail below, the 
DSHEA provides that the FDA can respond to proof of harmful ingre-
dients in dietary supplements.  This is unlike the FDA’s authority to 
                                                        
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194357.htm (last visited Oct. 
29, 2013).  
 9.  In a survey assessing beliefs and practices related to weight control, a substantial 
number of study participants assumed that the FDA reviews and approves dietary supple-
ments for safety and efficacy before being sold to consumers.  Janine L. Pillitteri et al., Use 
of Dietary Supplements for Weight Loss in the United States: Results of a National Survey, 16 
OBESITY 790, 794 (2008).  
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Singer & Lattman, supra note 6. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (codified as amended in various sections of 21 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
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regulate drugs, whereby any drug that enters the marketplace must 
first receive FDA approval that it is safe and effective.19 
As players in a $30 billion per year industry,20 manufacturers of 
dietary supplements have incentive and money to fight against regula-
tion.  Regulation of dietary supplements in a manner similar to that of 
drugs means that manufacturers would have to apply to the FDA for 
approval prior to marketing their products.21  The time consuming 
and expensive FDA approval process could have an impact on the die-
tary supplement industry by raising prices to consumers (for the in-
creased cost of approval) and/or by serving as a barrier to market-
entry for some manufacturers.  For these reasons, among others, the 
dietary supplement industry resists regulation. 
Consumers may also have reasons to resist regulation over the di-
etary supplement industry.  Consumers typically want to be able to 
choose whatever products they like without government interference.  
Some consumers believe that products promoted as “holistic” and 
“natural” are healthier alternatives to FDA approved drugs.22  Finally, 
consumers may appreciate the current lower costs of some dietary 
supplements as opposed to potential higher costs of FDA approved 
substances.23 
The arguments against regulation made by manufacturers and 
consumers alike are premised on the basic principle of autonomy.  
These arguments are reminiscent of the arguments surrounding de-
bates about regulation of tobacco.  The tobacco industry argued that 
tobacco is a natural product and should not be regulated.24  Consum-
ers/smokers argued for personal autonomy to use tobacco if they 
wished. 
                                                        
 19.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006); Development and Approval Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/default.htm (last visit-
ed Oct. 29, 2013). 
 20.  Singer & Lattman, supra note 6.  
 21.  See Development and Approval Process, supra note 19. 
 22.  Michael A. McCann, Dietary Supplement Labeling: Cognitive Biases, Market Manipula-
tion & Consumer Choice, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 215, 219 (2005). 
 23.  One scholar cautions policymakers to consider the effects of mandating pre-
market testing of dietary supplements.  Id. at 216.  As this scholar notes, mandated pre-
market testing of all dietary supplements could mean that “many beneficial dietary sup-
plements would be priced out of the reach of lower and middle income consumers who 
either have become users of those products or could become users.”  Id.  
 24.  The tobacco industry then worked for decades to debunk data that established 
that smoking is harmful.  See Lisa A. Bero, Tobacco Industry Manipulation of Research, 120 
PUB. HEALTH REPORTS 200, 204 (2005) (describing how the tobacco industry paid consult-
ants to criticize independent scientific research about tobacco’s harmful effects).   
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A concern addressed by this Article is not only the immediate 
safety risks associated with ingestion of unsafe dietary supplements, 
but also whether the dietary supplement industry is engaging in tac-
tics to evade regulation that are similar to the tactics that the tobacco 
industry used.  Regulators, researchers, and the public did not fully 
understand the web of deception employed by the tobacco industry 
until millions of pages of internal documents from the tobacco indus-
try were released as part of the Master Settlement Agreement in 
1998.25  In ten, twenty, or thirty years, will we learn the same thing 
about the dietary supplement industry?  How many adverse or lethal 
events must occur before Congress enacts legislation that provides the 
FDA with the authority to regulate the dietary supplement industry?  
Or will the dietary supplement industry continue to avoid regulation 
in much the same way as the tobacco industry has over the years? 
To address the role of the FDA in the twenty-first century with re-
spect to the dietary supplement industry, Part I of this Article begins 
by describing the dietary supplement industry and the role of the FDA 
in this industry.  In Part II, this Article provides a brief exposé of the 
tactics used by the tobacco industry to evade regulation.  The purpose 
of Part II is to provide insight into the tobacco industry’s ability to 
manipulate consumers and discount scientific proof of the harmful 
effects of smoking.  In Part III, this Article addresses solutions to con-
cerns over the current regulatory regime.  Although FDA regulation is 
likely the most effective way to ensure that products that are on the 
market are safe, Part III of this Article explores other non-regulatory 
mechanisms as well. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF REGULATION OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS 
Since 1994, the dietary supplement industry has been minimally 
regulated by DSHEA.26  Before 1994, supplements were regulated as 
food additives and manufacturers were required to show that supple-
ments were safe prior to entry into the market.27  In 1994, this regula-
tory scheme changed, and dietary supplements can now enter the 
                                                        
 25.  Id. at 200.  For a brief history of the tobacco industry documents, see Lisa A. Bero, 
Implications of the Tobacco Industry Documents for Public Health and Policy, 24 ANN. REV. PUB. 
HEALTH 267 (2003). 
 26.  Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325 (codified as amended in various sections of 21 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 27.  Pieter A. Cohen, American Roulette—Contaminated Dietary Supplements, 361 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1523, 1523–24 (2009). 
 2013 THE TOBACCO DIARIES 25 
marketplace without pre-market testing of safety or efficacy.28  This 
scheme is unlike the approval process for pharmaceutical drugs, 
which must undergo years of clinical testing before being approved by 
the FDA and brought to market.29  Under the DSHEA, the FDA only 
has the authority to remove a dietary supplement from the market 
upon repeated reports of adverse reactions.30 
Advantages of minimal regulation of dietary supplements, as 
compared to drugs, include lower costs to the consumer, consumer 
choice, availability of alternatives, and health benefits.31  Nevertheless, 
the disadvantages associated with the minimal deregulation of dietary 
supplements abound—namely, direct and misleading marketing of 
harmful products to consumers and the lack of enforceable standards 
for dietary supplement ingredients.32 
The term “dietary supplement” consists of a broad range of sub-
stances including vitamins, essential minerals, protein, amino acids, 
and herbs.33  Consumers are often surprised to learn that the supple-
ments on the shelves of their local drug store are regulated differently 
than the OTC medicines that might be right next to them.34  That is, a 
multivitamin falls under the DSHEA, but Advil—right down the 
aisle—is a regulated drug.35  Many consumers do not understand this 
difference. 
Dietary supplements are not intended to treat illness; they are to 
be used to supplement the diet.36  For this reason, labels on dietary 
                                                        
 28.  See id. at 1524 (“Since the passage of the DSHEA, dietary supplements are pre-
sumed to be safe and can be marketed with very little oversight.”). 
 29.  McCann, supra note 22, at 215. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 219, 259. 
 32.  Id. at 216.  One scholar proposes that “[a]ny optimal regulatory system for dietary 
supplements must . . . advance two essential, if competing, goals: 1) protect those most 
vulnerable from misleading health claims and unanticipated contents; and 2) enable an 
informed consumer class to purchase appreciably-beneficial products at predictable and 
affordable prices.”  Id. at 259. 
 33.  Dietary Supplements: What You Need to Know, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm109760.htm (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2013).  
 34.  Pillitteri, supra note 9, at 794. 
 35.  Multivitamins are the most popular dietary supplements in the United States; thir-
ty-nine percent of adults used them in 2006. Madison Park, Half of Americans Use Supple-
ments, CNN, Apr. 13, 2011, 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/HEALTH/04/13/supplements.dietary/index.html.  
 36.  See Dietary Supplements: What You Need to Know, supra note 33 (“Some supplements 
may help to assure that you get an adequate dietary intake of essential nutrients.  However, 
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supplements may not claim to treat, prevent, or cure diseases.37  De-
spite this restriction, many consumers turn to dietary supplements for 
these precise reasons.  Some consumers like that the products claim 
to be “natural”; they may equate “natural” with “safe.”38  If a consumer 
would like to learn more about a particular supplement—for exam-
ple, a list of adverse effects—he should contact the manufacturer, not 
the FDA.39 
The dietary supplement industry is a $30 billion per year indus-
try.40  While many supplements are considered benign or even benefi-
cial to consumers,41 this claim is hard to confirm or deny because the 
health effects of dietary supplements are rarely scientifically tested.  
Other dietary supplements, however, are likely harmful or deadly.42  A 
recent study illustrated that ingestion of several commonly used die-
tary supplements correlated with increased mortality risk.43  In this 
study, supplemental iron was closely associated with an increased risk 
of mortality in older women.44 
Many consumers try dietary supplements to assist with weight 
loss.45  In an industry-sponsored study, a research group surveyed 
3,500 Americans about the use of dietary supplements for weight 
                                                        
supplements should not replace the variety of foods that are important to a healthful di-
et . . . .”).  
 37.  Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-
01-11-00210, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: STRUCTURE/FUNCTION CLAIMS FAIL TO MEET 
FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 16 (2012).  Types of claims that are permitted on dietary supple-
ment labels include nutrient content claims, health claims, and structure and function 
claims; the FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition is primarily responsible 
for overseeing claims made on dietary supplement labeling.  Id. at 3.   
 38.  Dietary Supplements: What You Need to Know, supra note 33. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Singer & Lattman, supra note 6. 
 41.  McCann, supra note 22, at 215–16. 
 42.  Eric Lipton, Support Is Mutual for Senator and Utah Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/us/politics/21hatch.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(noting that federal records between 2009 and 2011 show that 2,292 serious illnesses were 
reported by consumers using allegedly harmless nutritional supplements); Singer & 
Lattman, supra note 6. 
 43.  Jaakko Mursu et al., Less Is More: Dietary Supplements and Mortality Rate in Older Wom-
en, The Iowa Women’s Health Study, 171 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1625, 1631 (2011).  The com-
mon dietary supplements associated with a higher risk of total mortality included multi-
vitamins, vitamins B6 and folic acid, as well as minerals iron, magnesium, zinc, and copper.  
Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Pillitteri, supra note 9, at 790. 
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loss.46  This study was sponsored by GlaxoSmithKline Consumer 
Healthcare, which received FDA approval for an OTC weight-loss 
drug.47  Presumably, the group was interested in learning about the 
use of weight-loss supplements and non-prescription drugs.  The re-
sults of this study showed that respondents believed these supple-
ments were approved for safety and efficacy prior to marketing.48  In 
addition, one-third of respondents believed that the weight-loss sup-
plements were safer than OTC or prescription medications.49   
Overall, this study showed that many respondents had misper-
ceptions about the regulation of dietary supplements.50  Recent re-
ports established that as many as one-hundred-forty dietary supple-
ment products contain undeclared active pharmaceutical 
ingredients.51  It is likely that this only represents a small fraction of 
contaminated supplements.52  In addition, some manufacturers in-
clude pharmaceutical analogues in their products, which make detec-
tion of undeclared ingredients difficult.53  Some of these analogues 
may be dangerous to the users; but, in any event, the risks are un-
known.54 
In sum, the DSHEA limits the FDA’s ability to regulate the die-
tary supplement industry.55  The FDA is limited in its ability to inter-
vene until there are numerous adverse reports or it discovers pharma-
ceuticals in the supplement.56  Consumers have a lot of autonomy in 
deciding which supplements to take, although recent studies suggest 
that many consumers are not aware that the supplements are not pre-
approved by the FDA.57  The dietary supplement industry’s resistance 
                                                        
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at 795 (see Acknowledgements). 
 48.  Id. at 793. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 793–94. 
 51.  Cohen, supra note 27, at 1523. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 1524. 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  See, e.g., id. at 1524 (“The DSHEA presents serious obstacles to the FDA’s ability to 
detect and eliminate contaminated supplements.”). 
 56.  See McCann, supra note 22, at 215 (“[M]ost dietary supplements—like most 
foods—can immediately enter the market, and only after repeated instances of adverse 
reactions can the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) remove them.”). 
 57.  Cohen, supra note 27, at 1524. 
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to regulation58 is reminiscent of the tobacco industry’s reaction to 
regulation by the FDA.59  For this reason, a summary of the tobacco 
industry’s attempts to avoid regulation is instructive to explain how 
and why the FDA has limited authority to regulate the dietary sup-
plement industry. 
II.  TOBACCO INDUSTRY TACTICS TO AVOID REGULATION 
For decades, the tobacco industry has evaded and avoided real 
regulation by the FDA.  Many of the arguments used by the dietary 
supplement industry to avoid regulation are similar to the strategies 
employed by the tobacco industry.  A brief history of some of the ma-
jor ways that the tobacco industry has remained elusive to regulatory 
control follows. 
Decades ago, the tobacco industry organized as an interest group 
to employ strategies to suppress scientific research on the risks and 
harms of smoking.60  In 1998, internal documents detailing the tactics 
utilized by the tobacco industry were unveiled as part of the Master 
Settlement Agreement;61 since then, scholars have poured over these 
documents that reveal how the tobacco industry maintained credibil-
ity while generating doubts about the risks associated with smoking. 
The tobacco industry funded research on smoking both by using 
its own scientists and by providing support to outside scientific con-
sultants.62  As part of these efforts, the tobacco industry created the 
Council for Tobacco Research, which had the appearance of being 
independent even though it was not.63  In addition to funding re-
search, the tobacco industry published and promoted findings that 
were favorable to its position.64  At the same time, the tobacco indus-
try organized to suppress or criticize research that contained evidence 
that did not support its position.65  The tobacco industry interest 
group disseminated information to the media that contributed to the 
                                                        
 58.  See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 42 (“[Senator Orrin G.] Hatch . . . has spent his career 
in Washington helping the [dietary supplement] industry thrive. . . . Mr. Hatch has re-
peatedly intervened with his colleagues in Congress and federal regulators in Washington 
to fight proposed rules that industry officials consider objectionable.”). 
 59.  See infra Part II. 
 60.  Bero, supra note 24, at 200. 
 61.  Id. at 201. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id. at 201–02. 
 64.  Id. at 202–03. 
 65.  Id. at 204. 
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lay press reporting that there was controversy about the risk of 
secondhand smoke, even though objective scientific studies were clear 
that secondhand smoke posed a health risk.66  Further, the tobacco 
industry promoted ventilation as an alternative to smoke-free envi-
ronments by funding studies to rebut data about secondhand smoke.67  
The tobacco industry attempted to use its research to influence poli-
cymakers.68 
In addition to funding its own research, the tobacco industry 
fought hard to defund independent scientific research.69  In 1994, Dr. 
Stanton A. Glantz won a $598,686 grant from the National Cancer In-
stitute (“NCI”) to study the effects of advocacy on tobacco policy.70  
Internal documents showed that the tobacco industry created a plan 
to put pressure on the funding of “anti-tobacco” research.71  From 
1994–1995, the tobacco industry utilized multiple outlets to attack the 
funding of Glantz’s grant.72  In 1995, when the appropriations bill for 
the NCI came to the House floor for a vote, it contained language 
that would strip Glantz of his grant award from the NCI.73  The scien-
tific community and its supporters petitioned politicians not to let the 
tobacco industry squash independent scientific inquiry.74  Nonethe-
less, the tobacco industry succeeded in convincing policymakers that 
the NCI should not fund or conduct some of the research provided 
for in Glantz’s grant.  The NCI informed the House Appropriations 
subcommittee that the NCI had ceased funding the portion of 
Glantz’s grant related to campaign contributions.75  Disgusted by the 
government’s decision, the American Cancer Society issued a grant to 
Glantz to continue that line of inquiry.76  Although, arguably, a badge 
of honor for an academic to be so vehemently opposed by the tobac-
                                                        
 66.  Id. 
 67.  J. Drope, S. A. Bialous, S. A. Glantz, Tobacco Industry Efforts to Present Ventilation as 
an Alternative to Smoke-Free Environments in North America, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 41, 41–43 
(2004). 
 68.  Bero, supra note 24, at 204–05. 
 69.  Anne Landman & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Industry Efforts to Undermine Policy—
Relevant Research, 99 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 45, 45 (2009). 
 70.  Id. at 47. 
 71.  Id. at 48. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 51. 
 74.  Id. at 51–52. 
 75.  Id. at 52.  The NCI did not reduce the grant; it merely shifted funds to the grant’s 
other purposes.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
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co industry, this story sheds light on the intense public and political 
pressures waged by the tobacco industry against research aimed at 
demonstrating the effects of the tobacco industry on public health 
policy. 
Use of the popular press is yet another tactic employed by the to-
bacco industry.  For example, the tobacco industry created an indus-
try front group known as the Associates for Research in the Science of 
Enjoyment (“ARISE”) in order to use mass media to endorse the 
healthfulness of tobacco use.77  This group promoted the pleasures of 
smoking in moderation as similar to having dessert or a cup of cof-
fee.78  The pleasure from smoking, the group suggested, is beneficial 
because it makes people happy.79 
Direct-to-consumer marketing cannot be emphasized enough as 
a tobacco industry tactic, especially to younger people because they 
are at high risk for smoking initiation.80  Analysis of industry docu-
ments released pursuant to a settlement agreement reveal that the to-
bacco industry developed marketing strategies for each level of ciga-
rette smoker, from those who are just beginning to experiment with 
cigarettes all the way to established smokers.81  These documents also 
reveal that the tobacco industry utilized research to implement its tac-
tics.82  For example, an internal memorandum from the tobacco 
company Philip Morris noted that a nonsmoker may become a smok-
er during times of stress.83  Young adults go through a series of stress-
ful life events as they gain independence.84  The tobacco industry 
knew it could use this information to market to young adults that cig-
arettes help them relax during times of stress.85  The tobacco industry 
also focused on integrating smoking into activities associated with 
young adults, such as music and social gatherings.86 
                                                        
 77.  Elizabeth A. Smith, “It’s Interesting How Few People Die from Smoking”: Tobacco Industry 
Efforts to Minimize Risk and Discredit Health Promotion, 17 EUR. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 162, 162 
(2006). 
 78.  Id. at 163, 165–66. 
 79.  Id. at 165. 
 80.  Pamela M. Ling & Stanton A. Glantz, Why and How the Tobacco Industry Sells Ciga-
rettes to Young Adults: Evidence from Industry Documents, 92 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 908, 908 
(2002). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 909. 
 83.  Id. at 911. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 913. 
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Finally, the tobacco industry spent enormous sums of money to 
maintain autonomy and undercut attempts by the government to 
regulate the industry.  For example, the tobacco industry spent a re-
ported $43 million to lobby against tobacco legislation sponsored by 
Senator John McCain.87  In another tactic, a cigarette manufacturer 
withdrew all its advertising from a newspaper that printed an editorial 
in favor of tobacco control.88  This was a clear signal to the media not 
to promote tobacco regulation.89 
In sum, the tobacco industry peppered the public with infor-
mation that smoking is safe and pleasurable.90  Behind the scenes, the 
tobacco industry groups influenced politicians to avoid regulation 
and even defund smoking research.91  The tobacco industry success-
fully staved off regulation for decades.  Even today, regulation of to-
bacco is minimal as many new and current smokers purchase ciga-
rettes for consumption every day. 
III.  REGULATORY AND NON-REGULATORY SOLUTIONS 
The manipulation of data and marketing techniques are not 
strategies singularly used by the tobacco industry.  Other industries 
employ similar techniques to promote their products and cast doubt 
on data that demonstrates negative effects.92  A recent study analyzed 
whether the tobacco, pharmaceutical, lead, vinyl chloride, and silico-
sis-generating industries employed similar tactics to manipulate re-
search.93  Using corporate documents released through litigation, the 
study found that the tested industries used a variety of manipulation 
techniques, including: 
(1) fund[ing] research that supports the industry’s interests, 
(2) publish[ing] in scientific literature research that sup-
ports the industry’s interests, (3) suppress[ing] industry-
sponsored research in cases where the results do not support 
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the industry’s interests, (4) distort[ing] public discourse on 
research that does not support the industry’s interests, (5) 
set[ting] scientific standards that favor the industry’s inter-
ests, and (6) disseminat[ing] favorable research directly to 
decision-makers and the public.94 
All of these industries faced litigation over health-related issues; all of 
these industries released documents that provided information that 
they used a variety of the six techniques listed above.95 
At this time, it may be impossible to know if the dietary supple-
ment industry is utilizing the same techniques as the tobacco, phar-
maceutical, lead, vinyl chloride, and silicosis-generating industries.  
Members of the dietary supplement industry employ consultants to 
assist in their cause.96  Members of the dietary supplement industry 
have relationships with members of Congress.97  Dietary supplements 
are marketed to consumers; for example, a number of dietary sup-
plements are advertised as assisting in weight loss.98  It is unclear 
whether the dietary supplement industry is colluding to fund research 
that supports its position. 
Providing the authority for the FDA to regulate dietary supple-
ments is the most conservative and most likely effective way to ensure 
that safe products are available to the public.  There are, however, ca-
veats to this solution.  It is likely that many supplements that are on 
the market do not require heavy-handed regulation.99  For example, 
should Vitamin C be regulated in the same manner as Jack3d, which 
contains dimethylamylamine?100  A regulatory scheme for dietary sup-
plements should consider the magnitude of the risk in different cate-
gories of dietary supplements.101 
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The FDA is not the only way to regulate the dietary supplement 
industry.  State and local regulations have been used to temper the 
tobacco industry.102  Examples of these regulations include enacting 
smoke-free indoor air laws and minimum age limits for purchasing 
tobacco products.103  In addition, settlements in litigation with the to-
bacco industry have placed limits on advertising and other marketing 
and have imposed requirements to reduce youth access to tobacco.104 
Similarly, non-FDA strategies can be used to inform the public 
about dietary supplements.  Local and state regulations, similar to the 
ones applied to cigarettes, can be employed.  In addition, perhaps the 
Federal Trade Commission could be granted the authority to direct 
manufacturers of dietary supplements to include warnings that com-
municate effectively the potential harms from taking a dietary sup-
plement.105 
Taxes are another way to regulate the industry.  State and local 
authorities can increase taxes on the sale of dietary supplements, 
much in the same way that cigarettes are taxed.  The increased price, 
through taxation, will deter some consumers from purchasing dietary 
supplements.  This approach, however, has multiple limitations.  First, 
it is a regressive tax that disproportionately affects low-income people, 
who are large users of dietary supplements.106  Second, it does nothing 
to address the safety concerns.  Finally, it is probably not a strong 
enough policy to have the dis-incentivizing effects that it might intend 
to have. 
Overall, the dietary supplement industry is winning the game of 
chess.107  If Congress attempts to propose legislation granting the FDA 
authority to regulate the industry, the dietary supplement industry 
maneuvers in a way to ensure the congressional attempt will be un-
successful.108  This is the same game played by the tobacco industry.109  
                                                        
 102.  Michael Givel & Stanton Glantz, The “Global Settlement” with the Tobacco Industry: 6 
Years Later, 94 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 218, 220–21 (2004). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 219–20. 
 105.  See McCann, supra note 22, at 250 (“[D]ietary supplement advertisements in 
books, magazines, mailings, infomercials, and other television and radio commercials fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).”). 
 106.  Id. at 224. 
 107.  See supra Part I. 
 108.  See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 42 (describing how the dietary supplement industry 
fought a proposed law that would give the FDA more power to regulate dietary supple-
ments).  
 109.  See supra Part II. 
 34 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES [VOL. 73:20 
The exact nature of the dietary supplement industry’s tactics will not 
be known until there is extensive litigation and a release of corporate 
documents.  It was only after the release of corporate documents in 
other industries that we learned the details of industry tactics to avoid 
regulation.110 
This Article suggests that we should not have to wait until litiga-
tion forces the release of corporate documents in order to learn if the 
dietary supplement industry is utilizing some of the same tactics as the 
tobacco industry.  Some dietary supplements are causing harm to 
consumers and the role of the FDA should be expanded to protect 
the public by ensuring that dietary supplements are safe. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As the saying goes: “Fool me once, shame on you.  Fool me twice, 
shame on me.”  Industries that do not want to be regulated employ 
similar tactics to avoid regulation.111  Some products in the dietary 
supplement industry have proven to be harmful.  While it may be 
over-inclusive to regulate the entire industry, doing so will mean that 
consumers are more likely to purchase safe products.  We can learn 
lessons from the big profit-earning tobacco industry and its tactics to 
avoid regulation, and we can apply those lessons to the dietary sup-
plement industry.  In the twenty-first century, the FDA should be 
granted the authority to regulate the dietary supplement industry. 
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